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COMMENTS
CONGRESS BLEWETT BY NOT
EXPLICITLY MAKING THE FAIR
SENTENCING ACT OF 2010 RETROACTIVE
Andrew Cockroft*
In 2013, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first Circuit Court
to retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The Fair Sentencing
Act sought to end the discriminatory effects of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1986 and its treatment of one gram of crack cocaine as the equivalent to one
hundred grams of powder cocaine. The Fair Sentencing Act was meant to
remedy the injustices brought about by the infamous 100:1 ratio in crackcocaine and powder cocaine minimum sentencing. Despite this purpose, the
Fair Sentencing Act does not contain language that explicitly and
unequivocally requires that the new mandatory minimums be applied
retroactively. Thus, a narrow reading of the Fair Sentencing Act would mean
that individuals sentenced under mandatory minimums that the law
acknowledged were, at the very least, perpetuating a racially discriminatory
system, would have to serve out those sentences. The Sixth Circuit in Blewett
v. United States held that a reading of the Fair Sentencing Act that did not
allow for retroactive application of the more lenient and less dubious
mandatory minimums created equal protection concerns that mandated
reading the text to allow for retroactive application. Although the original
Blewett panel decision has been heavily criticized, vacated, and eventually
overturned en banc, this Comment argues that the original Blewett panel was
correct in holding that equal protection requires reading the text of the Fair
Sentencing Act to allow for retroactive application.

* J.D., cum laude, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2015; B.A., University of Texas,
Austin, 2012. I would like to thank my parents, Randall and Susan Cockroft, for their love and
support.
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INTRODUCTION
Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”)1 in an attempt
to remedy the discriminatory effects of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
(“the Drug Act”).2 The Drug Act included mandatory minimums for the
possession of crack cocaine; it "treat[ed] one gram of crack cocaine as
equivalent to one hundred grams of powder cocaine for sentencing
purposes."3 The sentencing regime based on the 100:1 ratio led to the mass
incarceration of offenders, most of whom were black.4 The dramatic racial
disparity in drug sentencing led to the passage of the FSA.5
The FSA lessened the mandatory minimum ratio between crack and
powder cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1.6 However, in passing the FSA, Congress
did not include explicit language requiring that the new mandatory
1

Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
3
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 484 (6th Cir. 2013). See also The Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
4
See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal
Sentencing Policy: Chapter 7D (Feb. 1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS Table 34 (2011). See also Danielle Kurtzleben, Data
Show Racial Disparity in Crack Sentencing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 3, 2010, 2:45
PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/08/03/data-show-racial-disparity-in-cracksentencing, archived at http://perma.cc/U472-95CJ.
5
See infra text accompanying notes 192-204 for a discussion of the legislative history
behind the passage of the FSA. See also Marc Mauer, Beyond the Fair Sentencing Act, THE
NATION (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/157009/beyond-fairsentencing-act, archived at http://perma.cc/LL9Y-RBL9.
6
Fair Sentencing Act, 111 P.L. 220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373 (2010).
2
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minimums be applied retroactively. That is, the FSA did not include explicit,
undeniable language that would allow offenders sentenced under the old
sentencing regime of the Drug Act to benefit from the new, fairer mandatory
minimums.
In 2013, the original panel in United States v. Blewett faced the problem
raised by this lack of explicit language.7 Because the FSA lacked such
language, the original Blewett panel was left to find ways to make the FSA
realize its purpose: reducing the racial disparities in drug sentencing.8 The
panel relied on equal protection jurisprudence as well as the doctrine of
constitutional avoidance in holding that the FSA ought to apply
retroactively.9 Although the opinion has been heavily criticized and
ultimately overturned after a rehearing en banc,10 this Comment argues that
the original Blewett panel correctly decided that the FSA ought to apply
retroactively.
This Comment will proceed with the following parts. Part I describes
the history of crack sentencing, beginning with the passage of the Drug Act
in 1986. This part will detail the events leading to the passage of the Drug
Act and its effects, ultimately resulting in the passage of the FSA and the
original Blewett decision. Part I concludes with an overview of the reasoning
of the original Blewett decision. Part II will analyze the jurisprudence on
which the Blewett decision relies, including the law surrounding equal
protection and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Part III will
demonstrate how the original Blewett panel correctly articulated and used
these doctrines to hold that the FSA ought to apply retroactively. This Part
also provides an in-depth discussion of the various criticisms of the court’s
decision. A brief conclusion summarizes the discussion of the preceding parts
and discusses the implications of the original Blewett decision and its
ultimate reversal.

7

Blewett, 719 F.3d at 482.
See Letter from Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to,
U.S. Sen., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, U.S. Sent. Comm. (June 1, 2011) available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110602/Durbin_Leahy_
Franken_Coons_Comment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CC55-6SCD.
9
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 484. See also infra text accompanying notes 149-163 for a
discussion of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
10
See United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1779 (2014) (hereafter described as “Blewett II.”).
8
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I. BACKGROUND
Although the federal government’s “War on Drugs” began with the
Nixon administration,11 in the 1980s, law enforcement officials increased
their effort to stamp out casual drug use. These efforts coincided with the
proliferation of a new drug trend in the United States: in the late seventies
and early eighties cocaine began growing in popularity.12 Crack cocaine came
to the national spotlight following the death of basketball star Len Bias, who
died after reportedly using the drug following his selection by the Boston
Celtics in the first round of the 1986 NBA Draft.13 Congress, amid the
hysteria surrounding this new drug, passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
(“the Drug Act”),14 which created new mandatory minimum sentences for
defendants convicted of possessing or using a series of drugs, including crack
cocaine.15 The Drug Act instituted a 100:1 ratio between crack cocaine and
powder cocaine, treating one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to one
hundred grams of powder cocaine for sentencing purposes.16 A first-time
possessor of a small amount of crack cocaine would face a mandatory
sentence of five years in prison;17 however, the same person found to be
possessing powder cocaine would have to be in possession of one hundred
times that amount to warrant the same five-year sentence.18
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of those mandatory
minimums led to many constitutional challenges to the law. Challengers
claimed the law violated the Equal Protection Clause and cited various news
articles introduced in the Congressional Record that labeled crack dealers as

11

See President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?
pid=3048, archived at http://perma.cc/59K8-35U8.
12
See LaJuana Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence
Relevant in Crack Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375, 381 (2011) (citing
Eva Bertram et al., Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, 61-62 (1996); Doris Marie Provine,
Unequal Under Law: Race in the War on Drugs 76-77 (2007)).
13
See id.; see also Julie Stewart, Well Done Congress, Now Make Fair Sentencing Act
Retroactive, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2010, 5:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
julie-stewart/well-done-congress-now-ma_b_671008.html. It is worth noting that the reports
of Bias’ death from the use of crack cocaine have recently come under scrutiny. See Michael
Weinreb, The Day Innocence Died, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, available at http://www.espn.com/
espn/eticket/story?page=bias.
14
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).
15
See id.
16
See id.
17
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006).
18
Id.
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black youths and gangs,19 and expressed concern that crack cocaine "would
spill out of the ghettos" and find its way into the suburbs.20 Moreover,
challengers argued that the procedural irregularities surrounding the passage
of the new mandatory minimums indicated a discriminatory purpose behind
the law.21 For example, Congress held very few hearings on the enhanced
penalties and although the penalty ratio was originally set at 50:1 between
crack and powder cocaine, the ratio was doubled for arguably no reason.22
Despite this evidence, these challenges were not successful and the Drug Act
was upheld.23
Since its enactment, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act has had disastrous
consequences on the African-American community. The 100:1 crack cocaine
ratio has led to the imprisonment of thousands of offenders, most of whom
are black.24 The statistics are alarming. The U.S. Sentencing Commission
projected that approximately 30,000 federal prisoners would be serving crack
cocaine sentences by the end of 2011.25 In 2011, 83% of those prisoners were
black.26 In just one year, 2010, 92.7% of all crack cocaine defendants were
non-white, and the majority of them (78.5%) were black.27 Between 1988 and
1995, federal prosecutors did not bring a single case against a white person
"under the crack provision in seventeen states, including major cities such as
Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas, and Los Angeles."28

19

See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 783 n.48 (E.D. Mo. 1994) rev’d 34 F.3d
709 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing 132 Cong. Rec. S2495 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1986) (“[B]ig city
ghettos” are “infested with . . . crack houses” and “are centers of the new cocaine trade” in
crack); 132 Cong. Rec. S4670 (daily ed. April 22, 1986) (“Most of the dealers, as with past
drug trends, are black or Hispanic . . . [w]hites rarely sell the cocaine rocks.”); 132 Cong. Rec.
S7123 (daily ed. June 9, 1986) (Dealers “organize small cells of pushers, couriers and lookouts
from the ghetto’s legion of unemployed teenagers.”).
20
Id. at 783–84.
21
Id. at 784–85.
22
Id.
23
See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 1994).
24
See Kurtzleben, supra note 4; see also United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 485 (6th
Cir. 2013).
25
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Analysis of the Impact of Guideline Implementation of the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 if the Amendment Were Applied Retroactively, at 11-12 (May
2011).
26
U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Annual Report 2011 at 37.
27
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
Table 34 (2011).
28
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Dan Weikel, War on
Crack Targets Minorities over Whites, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/
1995–05–21/news/mn-4468_1_crack–cocaine).
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After acknowledging that the 100:1 sentencing ratio was the “primary
cause of the growing disparity between sentences for Black and White federal
defendants,”29 the United States Sentencing Commission recommended that
Congress reduce the sentencing ratio in 199530 and unanimously
recommended reducing the ratio in 199731 and 2002.32 Even after adjusting
the length of sentences for crack in 2007, Congress made no changes to the
100:1 ratio.33
Finally, in 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
(FSA),34 scaling back the harsh and racially disparate mandatory sentences
for crack offenses.35 The FSA changed the ratio between crack and powder
cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1 in order “to restore fairness to Federal cocaine
sentencing.”36 The statute took effect on August 3, 2010.37
When it was passed, it was unclear how the FSA would affect
individuals sentenced under the old regime.38 In passing the act, Congress
failed to include language that the FSA ought to apply retroactively—that is,
there was no explicit language stating that the act’s new sentencing standards
should apply to individuals convicted or sentenced prior to the enactment of
the FSA. In May 2011, the United States Sentencing Commission produced
a study which indicated that if the FSA were to apply retroactively, more than
12,000 offenders would be eligible to receive a reduced sentence.39
In 2012, in Dorsey v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the
case of several offenders who were charged with and convicted of crack
offenses prior to the enactment of the FSA, but had not been sentenced until

29

U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY, Chapter 7D (1995).
30
Id. at Chapter 8.
31
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY 2 (1997).
32
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY, at viii (2002).
33
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 488.
34
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
35
Mauer, supra note 5.
36
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 111 Pub.L. 220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373. (2010).
37
Id.
38
See Mauer, supra note 5; see also Stewart, supra note 13.
39
Memorandum from Office of Research & Data & Office of Gen. Counsel to Chair Saris,
et al., Analysis of the Impact of Guideline Implementation of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
if the Amendment Were Applied Retroactively 10 (May 20, 2011) (“These offenders were
sentenced between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 2010 (fiscal years 1992 through 2010),
and remained incarcerated as of November 1, 2011.”).
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after the law had passed.40 After acknowledging that the passage of the FSA
was, in part, motivated by public outcry over unjustified race-based
differences in sentencing,41 the Court held in favor of the criminal
offenders.42 The Court held that “Congress intended the Fair Sentencing
Act’s new, lower mandatory minimums to apply to the post-Act sentencing
of pre-Act offenders.”43 However, the Court left open the question of whether
the FSA would apply retroactively to all pre-Act offenders, regardless of
when their sentencing occurred. Even with the holding in Dorsey, there are
still countless crack offenders in federal prison serving sentences given to
them prior to the enactment of the FSA.
Since the passage of the FSA, there have been numerous attempts to
force the law to apply fully retroactively. Until the summer of 2013, every
circuit court to hear the issue found that the FSA should not apply to these
offenders.44 However, in United State v. Blewett, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals became the first circuit court to hold that the FSA’s new crack to
powder cocaine ratio ought to apply fully retroactively.45 The key difference
between the Blewett court and every other court to consider the issue is that
the Blewett court analyzed the issue of retroactivity as a constitutional
question, not merely as a question of statutory interpretation.46
The court in Blewett held that the equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment required that the FSA apply retroactively.47 The court
acknowledged that when the old 100:1 crack–powder ratio was adopted “it
presumably did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because there was no
intent or design to discriminate on a racial basis.”48 According to the court,

40

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (2012).
Id. at 2328.
42
Id. at 2335.
43
Id. It is important to note that the court only faced a question of statutory construction,
not a constitutional challenge to the FSA.
44
See United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1293-1295 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that
the FSA does not apply retroactively and agreeing with every other circuit considering this
question at the time); see also United States v. Kelly, 716 F.3d 180, 181–82 (5th Cir. 2013);
United States v. Lucero, 713 F.3d 1024, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 2013); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Crack
Cocaine, Congressional Inaction, and Equal Protection, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 241,
243 (describing that Blewett was the first circuit court decision upholding an equal protection
challenge to federal drug sentencing laws).
45
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Larkin supra note 44.
at 243.
46
Compare id. at 487 with Kelly, 716 F.3d at 181–82; Lucero, 713 F.3d at 1026; Augustine,
712 F.3d at 1293–95.
47
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 487.
48
Id. at 488.
41
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“[s]ince 1986, however, we have gained knowledge of the old statute’s
devastating effect on blacks.”49
The court’s equal protection analysis proceeded in three parts. First,
judicial action qualifies as state action for the purposes of equal protection.50
The court is bound by the same constitutional obligations as legislatures or
administrative agencies because when the court acts so does the state.51 The
Constitution prohibits giving legal effect to the discriminatory acts of others,
even if they are private parties.52
Second, if the court gave legal effect to the 100:1 ratio knowing what
we know now about its racial implications, such an act would become
intentional discrimination for the purpose of equal protection.53 A “‘disparate
impact’ case now becomes an intentional subjugation or discriminatory
purpose case.”54 This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirement of
sufficient intent to find a violation of equal protection.55 This finding of intent
is bolstered by the legislative history of the FSA, because part of the reason
for passing the FSA was to remedy the racially discriminatory effects of the
100:1 crack-cocaine ratio.56
Essentially, while a statute may not violate equal protection if it only
has a discriminatory impact, the FSA is different. The passage of the FSA
was a Congressional acknowledgement that the old sentencing regime had a
discriminatory impact. If the court were to give legal effect to something that
Congress rejected as discriminatory, then the court would impose the
discrimination that the FSA sought to avoid.
Third, the court is constrained to “interpret statutes and sentencing
guidelines so as to avoid potential conflict with the Constitution.”57 Here, the
court reasoned that the interpretation of the statute offered by the
Government would result in a violation of equal protection, thus requiring
that the court interpret the statute so as to avoid that constitutional violation.58
49

Id.
Id. at 490.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 489–90 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948); Ex Parte Virginia,
100 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1880)).
53
See id. at 489 (“There is no excuse for judges to engage in perpetuating such
discrimination or to sanction it by refusing to correct it.”).
54
See id. at 488 (“Like slavery and Jim Crow laws, the intentional maintenance of
discriminatory sentence is a denial of equal protection.”).
55
Id. at 488–89 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–298 (1987); Pers. Adm’r
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 429 U.S. 229 (1976)).
56
Id. at 489.
57
Id. at 487.
58
Id.
50
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Here the court uses the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to interpret the
FSA such that the imposition of unconstitutional discrimination can be
avoided.59
The court’s decision has been heavily criticized,60 most notably by the
dissent61 with which at least one federal district court explicitly agrees,62 as
well as the majority in Blewett I.63 Critics present four main arguments. First,
they argue that the original Blewett panel would turn every disparate impact
case into an intentional discrimination case.64 According to this argument,
the original Blewett panel contradicts precedent indicating that a disparate
impact alone is insufficient to show a violation of equal protection.
Second, critics argue that applying the FSA retroactively assumes that a
party can show a violation of equal protection by Congress’s failure to act.
This criticism relies on the original Blewett panel’s discussion of how the
FSA remedied the past discrimination resulting from the mandatory
minimums of the Drug Act. These critics state that to find a violation of equal
protection, the court must either reason that Congress intentionally
discriminated in passing the FSA or that Congress’s failure to remedy the
disparate impact of the Drug Act is constitutionally actionable.65
Third, the majority in Blewett II argued that there was a simple
explanation, one other than discrimination, for Congress's decision to not
apply the FSA retroactively: the state's interest in the finality of sentences. 66
According to the majority, it would make little sense for Congress to be
"deeply concerned about racial justice when looking at future sentences" and
then
"suddenly
bec[o]me
racist
when
contemplating
past

59
The Blewett court elaborated on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Id. at 487
(“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty
is to adopt the latter.”) (citations omitted).
60
See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 44; Ed Whelan, Crackheaded Ruling by the Sixth Circuit,
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (May 17, 2013, 1:57 PM), available at http://www.nationalreview.
com/bench-memos/348668/crackheaded-ruling-sixth-circuit-ed-whelan, archived at http://
perma.cc/8FN6-JQK4.
61
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 495–97 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
62
See United States v. Duty, 1:08CR00024-032, 2013 WL 3873076, at *5, n.5 (D. Va.
July 25, 2013) (“I agree with the dissent in Blewett that the constitutional argument is
invalid.”).
63
United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1779 (2014).
64
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 495–98 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
65
Larkin, supra note 44, at 252–54; Whelan, supra note 60.
66
Blewett II, 746 F.3d at 659.
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sentences[.]"67Because the state has an interest in maintaining the sentences
already imposed, Congress chose to have the new minimums be exclusively
prospective.68
Fourth, critics state that the Blewett panel improperly invoked the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, since the sentencing guidelines and the
FSA are not subject to two possible interpretations.69 This argument relies on
the Sixth Circuit decision in United States v. Hammond, where the court
considered whether the FSA, as read, requires retroactive application of the
new, lower mandatory minimums.70 That court held that the best
interpretation of the FSA foreclosed retroactive application.71 As such, critics
state that the original Blewett panel could not invoke any other interpretation
of the FSA other than the one enunciated by the court in Hammond.72
Following the decision of the original Blewett panel, the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided to vacate the decision and scheduled a rehearing
for the case en banc.73 In December 2013, the Sixth Circuit overturned the
panel decision, applying the same logic as the Blewett dissent.74 Despite the
decision, several offenders sentenced under the 100:1 crack–powder ratio
have cited the opinion in an attempt to have their sentences reduced, although
none have been successful.75
While the decision was overturned and heavily criticized, this Comment
argues that the original Blewett panel correctly decided that the FSA ought to
apply retroactively to defendants sentenced under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act
of 1986. Congress’s decision to change the standards for crack sentencing
based on the old sentencing ratio’s discriminatory effect on AfricanAmericans presents a unique issue. The original Blewett panel’s decision—
that enforcement of the old sentencing regime violated the Fifth
Amendment—was consistent with equal protection jurisprudence. Before
analyzing the particular arguments offered by the court, and answering the

67

Id.
Id.
69
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 496–97 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
70
Id. at 496; see also United States v. Hammond, 712 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2013).
71
Hammond. 712 F.3d at 336.
72
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 496–97 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
73
See Order at 1, United States v. Blewett, No. 12–5226 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013), ECF No.
111; Order at 1, United States v. Blewett, No. 12–5582 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013), ECF No. 104.
74
See United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1779 (2014).
75
See, e.g., United States v. Swangin, 726 F.3d 205, 207 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United
States v. Bell, 731 F.3d 552, 554 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Drewery, 531 Fed. App’x
675, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reeves, 717 F.3d 647, 650–51 (8th Cir. 2013).
68
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decision's critics, it is necessary to analyze the jurisprudence on which the
decision relies.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON WHICH THE BLEWETT PANEL
RELIES
In order to successfully claim that his or her right to equal protection has
been violated, a party must demonstrate that a state actor has intentionally
discriminated against them.76 A showing of intentional discrimination does
not necessarily mean that the discrimination is evident from the face of the
law itself.77 Instead, a party may show intentional discrimination through the
grouping of a variety of factors including the procedure preceding the
passage of the law, the law’s discriminatory effect, the legislative intent, and
the statements of the legislators themselves.78
It is often the case that a party may not argue that the law in question
ought to be invalidated. Instead, the party may simply show that the law is
subject to at least two interpretations, one of which avoids an interpretation
of the statute that introduces questions of the statute's constitutionality. In
certain cases, the court, based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,79
may choose the construction of the statute that avoids such questions.
A. EQUAL PROTECTION AND STATE ACTION

Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government is subject to
the same equal protection restrictions under the Amendment as state
governments are under the Fourteenth Amendment.80 The Equal Protection
Clause only applies to state action, not private action. The Equal Protection
Clause voids all state action of every kind that denies any of its citizens the
equal protection of the laws.81 Executive and legislative acts by the state or
federal government clearly fall within the meaning of state action.82
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court considered whether action on
the part of the judiciary in enforcing racially discriminatory agreements
constitutes state action within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause,

76

See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883).
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
78
Id. at 241–44.
79
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
80
See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
81
See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (1883).
82
See id.at 17.
77
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when the action taken by the court is the enforcement of a racially
discriminatory covenant.83 The Court concluded that if the agreements were
purely voluntary and lacked the involvement of the judiciary, then a
restrictive covenant standing alone could not be regarded as a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.84 The Court, however, stressed that the judicial
enforcement of the covenants brought them into the realm of state action.85
The Court held that the action of state courts and of judicial officers in
their official capacities constitutes state action.86 According to the Court, acts
of the judiciary have been held to be acts of the state since “the earliest cases
involving the construction of the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”87 In
supporting that judicial action constitutes state action within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited numerous examples of the
different types of state action the judiciary can take. First, the judiciary
enforces the laws of the state and therefore its acts constitute state action.88
Second, the Supreme Court has found violations of the Fourteenth
Amendment when the judiciary of a state applies common-law policies.89
Third, the Supreme Court ruled that the judiciary acts in enforcing commonlaw crimes.90
In applying these principles, the Court found that the enforcement of
racially restrictive covenants constituted state action “in the full and complete
sense of the phrase.”91 But for the intervention of state courts, supported by
the full panoply of state power, the covenants would have no legal effect.92
Thus, since the effect of the state action in question was to deny rights subject

83

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948).
Id. at 13.
85
Id. at 14.
86
Id.
87
Id. (citing Commonwealth of Va. v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880) (“It is doubtless
true that a State may act through different agencies,—either by its legislative, its executive, or
its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions of the amendment extend to all action of the State
denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these agencies or by
another.”)).
88
Id. at 15 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90– 91 (1908) (“The judicial act
of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act
of the state.”)).
89
Id. at 17 (citing American Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941)).
90
Id. at 17–18 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940)).
91
Id. at 19.
92
Id.
84
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to equal protection, it was the “obligation of this Court to enforce the
constitutional commands.”93
The Court in Shelley makes clear that acts of the judiciary constitute
state action. Moreover, the Shelley court clarifies that the judiciary acts as the
state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment when it construes and
enforces the laws of the legislature.94 Since judicial acts constitute state
action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when a court
serves as an interpreter of the law, the original Blewett panel correctly
understood its constitutional obligations in deciding the retroactivity of the
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 if reinforcing the mandatory minimums of the
Drug Act after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 would have
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
B. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT

To show a violation of the equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment, a party must show that the state intentionally discriminated
against an individual within a protected group;95 however, the Supreme Court
has held that a law or another official act cannot be unconstitutional solely
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.96 To find that a law violates
the equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment, a court must find that
the law or the official act had a discriminatory purpose.97 However, the
discriminatory purpose does not need to be express on the face of the statute
or within the official act.98 An inference of racial classification can be shown
in the absence of an outright, facially racial classification.99 An intentionally
discriminatory purpose may often be “inferred from the totality of the
relevant facts,” including, in some cases, whether the law “bears more
heavily on one race than another.”100
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corporation,
the Court identified three general factors to consider when analyzing whether
an official act or a statute was motivated by discriminatory intent in the

93

Id. at 20.
Id. at 15 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1908) (“The judicial act
of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act
of the state.”)).
95
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
96
Id.
97
Id. (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)).
98
Id. at 241.
99
Id.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
100
Davis, 426 U.S. at 242.
94
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absence of an outright statutory classification.101 There, the Court's analysis

“suggest[s] that certain inferences could be drawn based on our
knowledge and expectations of the operations of legislatures.”102 These
factors provide courts the ability to infer a decisionmaker's subjective,

discriminatory intent by “relying on the historical and social context of the
decision.”103
First, a showing of a clear pattern, “unexplainable on grounds other than
race,” of a disparity between one class and another can evidence a
discriminatory purpose.104 The Court, however, stressed that “such cases are
rare.”105 In the past, the Supreme Court has found intentional state action only
when the disparate impact on a protected class is quite stark.
As an example, the Court in Village of Arlington Heights cites Yick Wo
v. Hopkins.106 Yick Wo involved a state administrative agency’s decision to
bar virtually all persons of Chinese descent from receiving the proper
paperwork to continue operating their laundry businesses.107 Of the 200
persons of Chinese descent that applied for the proper permit, none were
granted a permit to operate.108 “Absent a pattern as stark” as the one
established in Yick Wo, disparate impact alone usually cannot establish
discriminatory intent.109
Second, the procedural background of the legislative or administrative
decision, including the sequence of events leading up to the decision, may
also be used to show the purpose of the decisionmaker.110 Those sorts of
events include “departures from the normal procedural sequence” which may
show that “improper purposes are playing a role.”111 If factors usually
considered to be important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a conclusion
contrary to the one reached, such departures could show that a decision was
motivated by an intent to discriminate.112
101

429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence
of intent as may be available.”).
102
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 305 (1997).
103
Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1077 (1998).
104
Id. (citations omitted).
105
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
106
Id.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
107
Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374.
108
Id. at 359.
109
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
110
Id. at 267.
111
Id.
112
Id.
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Third, the legislative or administrative history, including statements
made by decisionmakers, may be “highly relevant, especially where there are
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes
of its meetings, or reports.”113 In discussing every other factor, the Court
merely speaks of each factor’s “relevan[ce].”114 However, the Court finds that
the legislative history to not just be relevant, but potentially “highly
relevant.”115 Statements of legislators, whether they directly or indirectly
acknowledge the purpose of the law or decision, take on a great
importance.116
If, upon applying these factors to a statute or an official act, a court finds
that the act in question was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, then
“judicial deference is no longer justified.”117 The discriminatory purpose
behind an official act does not need to be the primary or but-for cause of a
decision.118 Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is violated when
discrimination was “a motivating factor in the decision.”119 The Court
emphasized that parties are not required to show that a decision was based
solely on a discriminatory purpose or “even that a particular [discriminatory]
purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one,” since rarely do legislatures or
administrative bodies make decisions “motivated solely by a single
concern.”120 The Court’s deference to the legislature and administrative
agencies is based on the notion that these political branches “are properly
concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations” which causes
courts to refrain from reviewing the merits of the political branches’
decisions, “absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.”121 Requiring a
showing of but-for causation would be an unreasonable burden on any
complaining party. Legislatures and administrative agencies make decisions
based on a variety of factors, making it difficult to assess which factors, in
fact, caused these decisions to be made. Thus, these factors are not meant to
divine the only purpose of a given decision; instead, the factors are only

113

Id. at 268.
See id. at 266–67.
115
Id. at 268.
116
See generally Ugo Colella, Trust the Tale, Not the Author: Judicial Review of
Legislative Motivation and the Problem of Proving A Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under
the California Constitution, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1081 (1996) (analyzing the application of
Arlington Heights in subsequent cases).
117
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266.
118
Id. at 265.
119
Id. at 265–66.
120
Id. at 265.
121
Id. (emphasis added).
114
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meant to show whether an impermissible discriminatory purpose was one of
many considerations that went into a decision.
In the year following the decision in Village of Arlington Heights, the
Supreme Court faced another case addressing the definition of “intent” for
the purposes of equal protection. In Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, the female plaintiff argued that the Massachusetts
veterans’ preference statute discriminated against her because of her sex.122
There, the plaintiff argued that “intent” for the purposes of equal protection
ought to mean the same as “intent” within the context of criminal and civil
law.123 In criminal and civil law, one “intends the natural and foreseeable
consequences of his voluntary actions.”124 In arguing that the legislature
knew that veterans were overwhelmingly male, the plaintiff argued that the
law was purposely discriminatory since a decision to prefer veterans was, in
its consequences, a decision to prefer men over women.125 As the lower court
asked, “[w]here a law’s consequences are that inevitable, can they
meaningfully be described as unintended?”126
The Court, however, dismissed this argument. Discriminatory purpose
implies “more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of
consequences.”127 Intent, for the purposes of equal protection, requires that
the decisionmaker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an
identifiable group.”128 Thus, discriminatory intent cannot be shown simply
by demonstrating that a discriminatory consequence was the inevitable result
of the decision or that the result was foreseeable.
Feeney does not demonstrate a departure from the factors set forth in
Village of Arlington Heights. Rather, the decision reaffirms that
discriminatory effects are not in themselves evidence of discriminatory intent
unless the effect is so great that discrimination is the only logical
explanation.129 The Feeney decision merely dictates that awareness of
inevitable or foreseeable effects is not a stand-in for an outright
discriminatory classification.130 However, Feeney does not mean that
evidence of discriminatory effects is irrelevant to an equal protection inquiry.
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130

442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979).
Id. at 278.
Id.
Id. at 275.
Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 151 (Mass. 1978).
Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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“If the impact of [a] statute could not be plausibly explained on a neutral
ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made by the law
was in fact not neutral.”131
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court again faced the issue of the
relevance of discriminatory effect to determining discriminatory intent. In
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court considered a challenge to a Georgia man’s
capital sentence.132 Particularly, the Court addressed “whether a complex
statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into
capital sentencing determinations” is sufficient to prove that the petitioner’s
capital sentence violates the Equal Protection Clause.133 In that case, the
petitioner offered a study of over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia
during the 1970s.134 The study, described by some scholars as “the most
complex and thorough study of its kind, in terms of the size of the sample
and the number of variables considered,”135 showed that “the death penalty
was assessed in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and white
victims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 1%
of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 3% of the
cases involving white defendants and black victims.”136
Ultimately, the study concludes that “black defendants were 1.1 times
as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.”137 The study
“indicates that black defendants . . . who kill white victims have the greatest
likelihood of receiving the death penalty.”138
In disregarding the statistical analysis offered by the petitioner, the
Court emphasized that, regardless of what the statistics showed, the petitioner
had to prove that the “decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory
purpose.”139 The Court offered three arguments for why the petitioner could
not satisfy the burden of showing that his jury acted with discriminatory
purpose using the statistics.

131

Id. at 275.
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282–83 (1987).
133
Id. at 282–83.
134
Id. at 286 (citing Baldus, et al., Pulaski, & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death
Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661
(1983)).
135
Steven F. Shatz, Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman,
McCleskey, and A Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2013).
136
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (citations omitted).
137
Id. at 287 (citations omitted).
138
Id.
139
Id. at 292.
132
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First, the Court stressed, “each particular decision to impose the death
penalty is made by a petit jury selected from a properly constituted venire.”140
Since “[e]ach jury is unique in its composition . . . the application of an
inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and
sentencing” is not appropriate.141
Second, in other contexts where statistics are permitted to prove
discrimination, “the decision-maker ha[d] an opportunity to explain the
statistical disparity.”142 According to the Court, “public policy . . . dictate[s]
that jurors ‘cannot be called . . . to testify to the motives and influences that
led to their verdict.’”143 Moreover, given their wide discretion, it would be
improper to require prosecutors “to defend their decisions to seek death
penalties, ‘often years after they were made.’”144
Third, “[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal justice process,”
the Court “demand[s] exceptionally clear proof before infer[ring] that the
discretion has been abused.”145 Given that each decision among each jury is,
by its very nature, unique, the disparities demonstrated by petitioner’s study
were deemed “insufficient to support an inference . . . of . . . discriminatory
purpose” in McCleskey’s case.146
Essential to each of the Court’s arguments is the nature and role of the
decisionmaker. Unlike legislative bodies or courts, jurors and prosecutors are
in a unique position where public policy dictates that the motivations of their
decisions remain theirs and theirs alone. McCleskey’s challenge did not fail
because a study cannot be evidence of discriminatory intent, nor did it fail
because a demonstration of discriminatory effect is irrelevant to show
discriminatory intent. “Despite the majority’s broad language, the brief
holding of the Court was much narrower:” his challenge failed because juries
and prosecutors make decisions that are tailored to the specific facts at hand,
which the law affords great discretion. 147
It is only because McCleskey could not offer a study to show that his
jury was motivated by a discriminatory purpose that he did not prevail. 148
140

Id. at 294.
Id.
142
Id. at 296.
143
Id. (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907) (alteration
in original)).
144
McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296 (citation omitted).
145
Id. at 297.
146
Id.
147
Steven F. Shatz, Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman,
McCleskey, and A Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1238 (2013).
148
Id. at 294 (“Each jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution requires that
141
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McCleskey, then, at most stands for the proposition that when the
decisionmaker is given nearly total discretion, general statistics may not by
themselves sufficiently prove that said decisionmaker acted with
discriminatory intent.
C. THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE

When faced with a statute subject to two possible interpretations, one of
which has constitutional implications, the court considering the statute should
adopt the interpretation that avoids those constitutional issues.149 This is one
of the many features of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Courts can
similarly avoid constitutional issues in how they choose which legal issues
to consider in deciding a case. 150 However, the cases with which this
Comment is concerned present situations where a text is susceptible to
multiple meanings, one of which compels consideration of constitutional
issues.
The text of a statute can sometimes have more than one possible
meaning.151 It has been long settled that “if a statute has two possible
meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the
meaning that does not do so.”152 Courts must choose the interpretation of an
act that “save[s] the act.”153
Constitutional avoidance can be thought of as a “substantive cannon of
interpretation.”154 Rather than strictly being a cannon of textual
interpretation, the constitutional avoidance cannon “typically focus[es] on
the underlying values the cannon serves.”155 The cannon functions as a means
of giving statutes their intended meanings; allowing “courts to refrain from
striking down statutes full stop, functioning as ‘a means of giving effect to
congressional intent, not of subverting it.’”156 Within the doctrine, the court
its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors that vary according to the
characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the particular capital offense.”). See
also John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty
Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1916-17 (2012).
149
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012).
150
See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 203 (2009).
151
Id. (“To take a familiar example, a law that reads ‘no vehicles in the park’ might, or
might not, ban bicycles in the park.”).
152
Id.
153
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring).
154
Gilbert Lee, How Many Avoidance Canons Are There After Clark v. Martinez?, 10 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 193, 198 (2007).
155
Id. (citations omitted).
156
Id. at 198-99 (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005)).
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assumes that Congress “intends to legislate within constitutional bounds,”
thus binding the court “interpret the legislature’s work in any way that will
result in its validation.”157
There is no requirement that the interpretation that avoids the
constitutional violation is the most natural one, “but only whether it is a
‘fairly possible’ one.”158 Constitutional avoidance “dictates that judges
refrain from wielding the power of judicial review if there is a statutory
construction available to avoid doing so.”159 In fact, “every reasonable
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from
unconstitutionality.”160 Thus, in considering how to interpret a particular
statute, courts are obliged to choose interpretations of the statute that avoid
constitutional issues or doubts.
When analyzing whether the original Blewett panel correctly invoked
this doctrine, there are two questions that must be asked: (1) Is the FSA
susceptible to multiple interpretations?161 and (2) Is there a “fairly
possible”162 interpretation that avoids “grave and doubtful constitutional
questions?”163
III. APPLYING THE JURISPRUDENCE TO THE BLEWETT DECISION
The original Blewett panel held that the application of the mandatory
minimums imposed by the Drug Act violated the equal protection principles
of the Fifth Amendment.164 The court, as a state actor, is compelled to avoid
the maintenance or legal effectuation of a discriminatory regime. As such,
the court may not construct a statute so that it perpetuates such a
discriminatory regime. With this position in mind the original Blewett panel
reasoned that the discriminatory effect of the Drug Act’s sentencing regime
coupled with the purpose of and statements contemporaneous to the passage
of the FSA mandated that the court interpret the FSA so that it would apply
retroactively.165

157
William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 844 (2001).
158
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
159
See Kelley, supra note 157, at 845.
160
Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895).
161
Id. at 384-85.
162
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
163
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
164
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013).
165
Id.
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A. OBLIGATIONS OF THE COURT AS A STATE ACTOR

The court in Blewett correctly understood its obligation under the equal
protection principles of the Fifth Amendment. The judiciary is not protected
from constitutional violations merely because it enforces the laws offered by
the legislature or even when it gives legal effect to private action.166 The
dissent in Blewett does not offer any explicit criticism of the majority’s use
of Shelley v. Kraemer; however, others have argued that the conclusion
offered by the Court is illogical.167
These critics argue that the logic of the Court would mean that once it
becomes known that a law has a racially disparate impact, the maintenance
of that law would be transformed into intentional discrimination.168
According to this argument, such a conclusion is at odds with equal
protection jurisprudence that permits racially disparate impacts, but not
racially disparate treatment.169
However, this argument fails in two respects. First, it assumes that
courts following the original Blewett panel would treat all disparate impact
claims similarly. These critics fail to acknowledge the severity of the impact
the Court wishes to avoid, namely, statistics that just barely fail to reach the
requirements of showing an automatic inference of racially discriminatory
purpose.170 Second, in Shelley the Court acknowledged that the judicial
maintenance of a discriminatory regime violated equal protection. In that
case, the Court’s argument is that the maintenance, the legal empowering, of
a discriminatory act constitutes a violation of equal protection.171 While it is
true that in Shelley the act that would be given effect was, self-evidently, an
act of pure intentional discrimination,172 that does not change the fact that
certain consequences of a judicial decision ought to give rise to equal
protection considerations.
It is certainly consistent with modern equal protection jurisprudence that
a pattern of discrimination and discriminatory effects, coupled with
legislative history and other factors, may give rise to an inference of
intentional discrimination, or at least that a continuance of such a regime
166

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1948).
See supra note 60.
168
Larkin, supra note 44, at 254; Whelan, supra note 60.
169
See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
170
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013) (“These alarming numbers
are not unlike the Supreme Court’s early cases of facially neutral laws creating an
overwhelmingly disparate result.”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
171
Shelley, 334 U.S. at 15–16.
172
Id. at 7–8. (The Court invalidated a racial restrictive covenant that, on its face, sought
to exclude non-whites from the neighborhood).
167
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could constitute purposeful discrimination.173 Thus, insofar as these
criticisms discredit the role of the judiciary in engaging in intentional
discrimination as a state actor, they are not consistent with case law. Courts
are barred by the Constitution from giving legal effect to discrimination.174
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT

The original Blewett panel correctly demonstrated that the retroactive
application of the FSA was mandated by the Drug Act’s racially disparate
impact coupled with the fact Congress acknowledged and sought to rectify
this impact in passing the FSA. The Blewett court gave two arguments
analyzing why the failure to retroactively apply the FSA would constitute
intentional discrimination for the purposes of equal protection. First, the court
highlighted the discriminatory effect of the old 100:1 sentencing ratio. More
specifically, the court highlighted the astonishing statistics demonstrating
how the old sentencing ratio overwhelmingly disadvantaged AfricanAmericans. Of particular import was that under the 100:1 sentencing ratio,
92.7% of the defendants in crack cases were non-white,175 that in between
1988 and 1995, no whites were prosecuted under some of America’s biggest
cities’ crack laws,176 and that the United States Sentencing Commission
routinely, and often unanimously, suggested during the reign of the 100:1
sentencing ratio that Congress change the ratio in order to avoid the “primary
cause of the growing disparity between sentences for Black and White federal
defendants.”177 According to the court, the continuation of such
discriminatory effects would be “intentional subjugation or [a]
discriminatory purpose case.”178 Put simply, the panel indicated it would be
intentional discrimination for it to force the Blewett defendants to continue
their pre-FSA sentence with the facts we know now. The court acknowledged
that if it “continue[d] now with a construction of the statute that perpetuates
the discrimination, there is no longer any defense that the discrimination is
unintentional.”179

173

See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68
(1977).
174
See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 15-16.
175
Blewett, 719 F.3d. at 487 (citing UNITED STATES SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.34 (2011)).
176
Id. (citation omitted).
177
Id. at 487–88 (quoting UNITED STATES SENT’G COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, at Chapter 7D (Feb. 1995)).
178
Id. at 488.
179
Id.
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The dissent in Blewett argued that the court’s holding was barred by the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Feeney and McCleskey. As discussed above,
both of these cases limit the ways in which a court can consider disparate
impact in finding intentional discrimination. However, neither of these cases
invalidates the reasons offered by the majority.
First, the Feeney decision does not make disparate impact issues
disappear. In fact, the Court in Feeney acknowledges that when an otherwise
neutral statute has a discriminatory impact that is unexplainable, then such
effect may give rise to the inference of intentional discrimination.180 The
Feeney decision only holds that awareness of possible disparate impact does
not, on its own, demonstrate intentional discrimination for the purposes of
equal protection.181 The majority in Blewett, however, offers more than just
an awareness of the discriminatory consequences;182 it chronicles nearly two
decades of unexplainable discriminatory effects.183
Nor does McCleskey invalidate the original Blewett majority’s finding
of intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court’s decision to refuse the
data offered in McCleskey was not evidence of an aversion to statistics.
Rather, the Court was concerned that general statistics offer little insight into
particular decisions made by juries and prosecutors.184 Of particular concern
for the Court was that the statistics offered by McCleskey did not show that
his jury or his prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent.185 However, the
Blewett court correctly argued that crack sentencing is different from the
individual and particular considerations given in death penalty sentencing. In
crack sentencing, “the defendant’s independent characteristics do not factor
into the equation, and the decisionmaker’s choice is a discretionless
mandatory minimum.”186 In crack sentencing, the charge will be “based on
an objectively verifiable quantity of crack, and the court will impose a
sentence no lower than that mandated by Congress.”187 Therefore, unlike the
decisions in McCleskey, where discretion was the central feature of the

180

Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979).
Id. at 279.
182
The court does, however, show that over the course of several years Congress refused
the advice of the United States Sentencing Commission to reduce the 100:1 sentencing ratio
because of its unnecessary, discriminatory effect. Blewett, 719 F.3d at 487–88.
183
See id.
184
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–96 (1987).
185
Id. at 297.
186
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 489.
187
Id. (citing David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV.
1283, 1316-18 (1995)).
181
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sentence, the types of decisions in crack sentencing are so mechanical that
sentencing is merely the direct application of the law.
It is true that the court must show more than disparate impact to give
rise to the inference that intentional discrimination is at work.188 This is
especially true since no other circuit court has ever held that the old 100:1
sentencing regime violated equal protection despite its discriminatory
effect.189
The original Blewett panel, however, does offer more. What makes the
Blewett decision different from previous decisions permitting the 100:1
sentencing ratio is that none of those prior cases addressed the equal
protection issue following the passage of the FSA. The legislative history of
the FSA, along with statements made by the FSA’s proponents, evidence
Congress’s determination that the 100:1 ratio constituted impermissible
discrimination.
It is without question what the purpose of the FSA was. The FSA was
an attempt to remedy the race-based disparity created by the old sentencing
ratio. Given that the main criticism offered against the majority in Blewett is
that it relies on a finding of disparate impact, it is important to chronicle all
of the statements made by the law’s proponents as well as other influential
lawmakers along with the purpose of the FSA itself.
The FSA was adopted “because the public had come to understand
sentences embodying the 100:1 ratio as reflecting unjustified race-based
differences.”190 In fact, the preamble to the law signifies itself as “[a]n Act to
restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.”191 The Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy, when reflecting on the
purpose of the FSA, stated that the former 100:1 ratio is “one of the most
notorious symbols of racial discrimination in the modern criminal justice
system.”192
Congress acknowledged that the basis of the old sentencing regime was
either misplaced or simply incorrect. Senator Dick Durbin, one of the FSA’s
sponsors, quoted Vice President Joe Biden as saying that “[e]ach of the myths
upon which we based the disparity has since been dispelled or altered.”193
Representative Robert C. Scott, then-Chairman of the House Judiciary
188

Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994). See also LaJuana Davis,
Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence Relevant in Crack Cocaine
Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375, 397 (2011).
190
Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2012).
191
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).
192
156 Cong. Rec. S1683 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010).
193
155 Cong. Rec. S10491 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009).
189
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Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, stated that “[w]e
are not blaming anybody for what happened in 1986, but we have had years
of experience and have determined that there is no justification for the 100to-1 ratio.”194 There was even acknowledgement of just how arbitrary the
100:1 sentencing ratio was. Representative Daniel E. Lungren recalled that
“[Congress] initially came out of committee with a 20-to-1 ratio. By the time
we finished on the floor, it was 100-to-1. We didn’t really have an evidentiary
basis for it, but that’s what we did, thinking we were doing the right thing at
the time.”195
Finally, Congress acknowledged, with very precise language, how the
old sentencing regime ran contrary to the equal protection principles of the
Constitution. Senator Patrick Leahy argued that “[t]he racial imbalance that
has resulted from the cocaine sentencing disparity disparages the
Constitution’s promise of equal treatment for all Americans.”196 The House
Majority Whip at the time, Representative James E. Clyburn, stated that
[t]he current drug sentencing policy is the single greatest cause of the record levels of
incarceration in our country. One in every thirty-one Americans is in prison or on parole
or on probation, including one in eleven African-Americans. This is unjust and runs
contrary to our fundamental principle of equal protection under the law. 197

Representative Steny Hoyer put it simply: “The 100-to-1 disparity is
counterproductive and unjust.”198
There was even acknowledgement that the FSA would repeal the
existing, unjust 100:1 ratio. Senator Richard Durbin argued that
[t]his is the first time the Senate Judiciary Committee has ever reported a bill to reduce
the crack-powder disparity, and if this bill is enacted into law, it will be the first time
since 1970-40 years ago that Congress has repealed a mandatory minimum sentence.
Every day that passes without taking action to solve this problem is another day that
people are being sentenced under a law that virtually everyone agrees is unjust. If this
bill is enacted into law, it will immediately ensure that every year, thousands of people
are treated more fairly in our criminal justice system. 199

In fact, in a letter written to the Honorable Patti B. Saris of the United
State Sentencing Commission, Senators Patrick Leahy, Richard Durbin, Al
Franken and Christopher Coons asked the Commission to apply the FSA
retroactively.200 In that letter, the Senators argued that to disallow retroactive
194
195
196
197
198
199
200

156 Cong. Rec. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010).
Id. (emphasis added).
156 Cong. Rec. S1682 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010).
156 Cong. Rec. H6198 (daily ed. July 28, 2010).
156 Cong. Rec. H6203 (daily ed. July 28, 2010).
156 Cong. Rec. S1681 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010) (emphasis added).
See Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen., Richard Durbin, U.S. Sen., Al Franken, U.S.
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application of the FSA would “be entirely inconsistent with the primary
purposes of the 2011 Amendment and the Fair Sentencing Act: reducing
racial disparities in drug sentencing, increasing trust in the justice system
and focusing limited resources on serious offenders.”201 They directed that
the Commission apply the FSA retroactively to “ensure that individuals in
our federal prisons are not serving disproportionate and racially disparate
sentences because of the date of their sentencing.”202
Amid these statements professing the purpose of the FSA,
acknowledging the arbitrariness of the old sentencing regime, and plainly
stating that the old sentencing regime undermined equal protection, Congress
passed the FSA. The opinion of the original Blewett panel, then, offered more
than the disparate impact of the old sentencing regime as evidence of the
“grave and doubtful constitutional questions.”203 The court offered the
extensive legislative history, the most important factor when accounting for
discriminatory purpose in a legislative body.204
In response, critics have offered three reasons for why the legislative
intent behind the FSA is insufficient to show an equal protection problem
with enforcing the old sentencing regime. First, they argue that if the 100:1
sentencing ratio is discriminatory, then why not the amended 18:1 sentencing
ratio to make it 1:1?205 This argument assumes that the original Blewett panel
did not offer “a constitutionally relevant distinction between the old ratio and
the new ratio” that was sufficient to justify an equal protection claim. 206
However, the majority did provide such a distinction. The majority’s reliance
on the legislative history of the FSA demonstrates, in great detail, how the
100:1 ratio was “the single greatest cause of the record levels of incarceration
in our country.”207 Every single time the majority offered arguments of
Congresspersons, each argument contained either implicit or explicit
comparisons between the new and old sentencing ratio. Moreover, given just
how disparate the impact of the 100:1 sentencing ratio was, it stands to reason

Sen., and Christopher Coons, U.S. Sen., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, U.S. Sent. Comm.
(June 1, 2011) available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/
public-comment/20110602/Durbin_Leahy_Franken_Coons_Comment.pdf.
201
Id. (emphasis added).
202
Id.
203
United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909).
204
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68 (1977) (noting
that legislative history is “highly relevant” where every other factor is only considered
“relevant”).
205
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 496 (6th Cir. 2013) (Gilman, J., dissenting).
206
Id.
207
156 Cong. Rec. H6198 (daily ed. July 28, 2010).
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that reducing the effect of that impact by more than 80% would do more than
enough to demonstrate how the new ratio avoids violating equal protection.
What’s more, even if it were true that the 18:1 sentencing ratio was also
discriminatory, it is unclear why that fact would lead one to conclude that the
clearly more discriminatory 100:1 ratio should still be applied. What is
relevant is that Congress acknowledged the folly of the 100:1 ratio when it
implemented the new 18:1 ratio. The fact that this explicit comparison exists
in the congressional record is sufficient acknowledgment that the old
minimums were discriminatory and that new minimums were less
discriminatory and less onerous.
The second criticism offered is that the original Blewett panel
misunderstood how legislative intent is treated within equal protection
analysis because it held that Congress acted with discriminatory intent
through an act of recklessness or negligence-failing to make the new
minimums retroactive.208 This argument relies on the assumption that the
Blewett panel considered Congress’s failure to pass a law like the FSA for
twenty-four years as the equal protection problem in the case; that Congress’s
failure to act violates the Constitution.
This argument fails on multiple fronts. First, it mischaracterizes the
argument of the Blewett majority. The original Blewett panel does not argue
that Congress acted with discriminatory purpose or negligence in 2010.
Rather the Blewett majority discerned the intent of Congress in passing the
FSA, acknowledging that it would bring grave constitutional concerns if
Congress simultaneously acknowledged that past sentences under the Drug
Act were discriminatory yet it continued to enforce them.209 Second, as was
explained above in Part II, a finding of discriminatory intent requires
investigating numerous factors, including the legislative history and the
disparate effect, if it reaches sufficient levels, of a particular law or
administrative decision.210 The reason that disparate impact cases have not
shown sufficient evidence to give rise to the inference of intent is that there
is often nothing more than the discriminatory impact, nothing in the
legislative or administrative record detailing how discrimination took
place.211 But what could be more persuasive evidence of impermissible
discrimination than Congress acknowledging that it acted wrongly? Its action
in 1986 gave rise to, in the words of one of the FSA proponents, “one of the
most notorious symbols of racial discrimination in the modern criminal
208
209
210
211

Larkin, supra note 44, at 258.
See Blewett, 719 F.3d at 488.
Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977).
See supra Part I.B.
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justice system.”212 To prove intentional discrimination all that is necessary is
to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision by the
governmental body.213 The Blewett court did that and more by demonstrating,
not just that the old sentencing ratio had a discriminatory impact, but that
Congress acknowledged that impact (by stating that it was discriminatory and
arbitrary), and that Congress desired that such discrimination be stopped.
Finally, the majority in Blewett II argue that the original Blewett panel’s
“theory of discrimination . . . makes little sense” because it assumes that
Congress was “deeply concerned about racial justice when looking at future
sentences,” but “suddenly became racist when contemplating past
sentences[.]”214 Rather than simply stating that the original Blewett panel
offered an incoherent reading of Congress’s intent in passing the FSA, the
majority in Blewett II attempts to close the loop. According to the Blewett II
majority, the reason Congress was only concerned about future sentences, as
opposed to those sentences already imposed, was that “[t]he government has
a powerful interest in avoiding the disruption of final sentences.”215
However, the Blewett II majority places far too much emphasis on the
FSA’s concern for the finality of sentences. Indeed, the FSA “permits a slew
of similarly situated crack offenders to disrupt finality” of their respective
sentences.216 The majority and the Government agreed that those sentenced
above the 100:1 ratio-presumably the more serious offender-may disrupt the
finality of their sentences in seeking a reduction in line with the minimums
set forth in the Drug Act.217 Yet the majority and the Government would deny
such a reduction to an individual sentenced at the 100:1 minimumpresumably a less serious offender.218
What’s more, the Blewett II majority’s reliance on the interest In finality
begs the question: what is the finality in service of? Surely an interest in
finality cannot, with that proclamation alone, avoid the system that “finality”
reproduces. Quite the contrary, “[t]here is little societal interest in permitting
the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to
repose.”219 Indeed, finality is of little importance when it is nothing more than
a “euphemism for ossifying an arbitrary and discriminatory classification.”220
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220

156 Cong. Rec. S1683 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010) (citation omitted).
Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66.
United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 674 (Cole, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989)).
Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., in Support
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It is difficult to see how “finality can support criminal convictions and overly
onerous sentences based upon a premise that Congress has overwhelmingly
and demonstrably acknowledged to be false as of the day it was passed.”221
Rather than “finality” answering the concerns offered by the original Blewett
panel, such a state interest only reinforces the original panel’s argument:
finality cannot force the Blewetts to serve sentences that Congress
acknowledged were unfair and discriminatory.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE

The original Blewett panel held that the constitutional avoidance
doctrine compelled the court to accept an interpretation of the retroactivity of
the FSA that avoids violating the equal protection principles inherent in the
Fifth Amendment.222
In Blewett, the Government argued that the FSA ought not be applied
retroactively because a mandatory minimum does not fit the language in the
applicable statute: “sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by
the Sentencing Commission.”223 The Government argued that the Blewetts’
sentences could not be retroactively lowered because they did not fall in the
narrow exception provided by the Sentencing Guidelines.224 Essentially, the
Government stated that “a court may consider a defendant for a sentencing
reduction only ‘in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term
of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”225 Since the Blewetts had been
sentenced based on a statutory minimum, not on a guideline range, and the
Sentencing Commission did not lower their guideline range or statutory
minimum, the court may not reduce their sentence.226 Put simply, even
though the FSA reduced the statutory minimum for crack offenses, since the
of Defendants-Appellants, at 18. United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No.
12-5226).
221
Blewett II at 684 (Clay, J., dissenting).
222
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013).
223
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2012) (“[I]n the case of a defendant who has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment,
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,
if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.”).
224
Supplemental Brief for Appellee United States of America, at 6-7. United States v.
Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5226).
225
Brief for Appellee United States of America, at 19, United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d
482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5226) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)).
226
Id. at 19.
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Sentencing Commission itself did not lower the sentencing range, the
Blewetts cannot have their sentences reduced.
The court held that the Government’s interpretation of the FSA ought to
be rejected given that it would result in a violation of equal protection as
explained above.227
First, the Blewett court analyzed whether the language and purpose of
the FSA would, by itself, justify retroactivity even without considering
constitutional issues.228 The analysis provided by the court gives more than
the “fairly possible”229 reading of the statute required to activate the doctrine
of constitutional avoidance.
In the FSA Congress sought to reduce crack sentences by increasing the
drug amounts “triggering mandatory minimums for crack offenses from five
grams to twenty-eight grams in respect to the five-year minimum.”230
In the face of the Government’s interpretation of the statute, the Blewett
panel favored the less constitutionally problematic interpretation offered by
the Blewetts: that statutory minimums condition and limit the guideline
range, so when the statutory minimum is reduced, then the guideline is also
reduced.231 If the sentencing range offered to the defendants is the main issue,
then nothing could be more relevant than the mandatory minimums that apply
to that defendant.232 Mandatory minimums and maximums provide the
“bookends” for the guideline range.233 The Sentencing Commission instructs
judges to view mandatory minimums within the context of the suggested
guideline range, allowing the applicable guideline range to condition
minimum sentencing.234 As an example, “if a defendant’s guideline range is
fifty to seventy months with a statutory minimum of sixty months,” the actual
range is “sixty to seventy months.”235 If the statutory minimum changes and
takes it out of the offender’s guideline range, then the range has been lowered.
This contradicts the Government’s argument, since the Government treats the
227

Blewett, 719 F.3d at 490.
Id. at 491.
229
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932).
230
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 491 (quoting Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329
(2012)); see also Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat 2372 (2010).
231
Brief for Appellants Cornelius Demorris Blewett and Jarreous Jamone Blewitt, at 3-5,
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5226).
232
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 491 (“The mandatory minimums and maximums are an integral
part of and gave rise to the sentencing guideline ranges.”).
233
Id.
234
U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (2013) (“Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater
than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum
sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”).
235
Blewett, 719 F.3d at 492.
228
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statutory minimums and the guideline ranges as separate inquiries and not
working in tandem. The revised crack guidelines are therefore mandated by
the new mandatory minimums. The mandatory minimum for crack cocaine
was lowered and, therefore, the Blewetts’ guideline range was also lowered.
Moreover, the original Blewett panel’s rationale can be understood by
looking to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey.236 In finding that the
FSA’s 18:1 sentencing ratio ought to apply to those offenders whose offenses
predated the act, but whose sentences postdated the act, the Court in Dorsey
offered a series of considerations finding that the statute pointed “clearly in
that direction.”237
First, the Supreme Court noted that applying the old sentencing regime
to those offenders whose offenses predated the act, but whose sentences
postdated the act, would “create disparities of a kind that Congress enacted
the Sentencing Reform Act and the Fair Sentencing Act to prevent.”238 In so
finding, the Court considered the sentencing outcomes of two hypothetical
individuals with the same number of prior offenses who each engaged in the
same criminal conduct involving the same amount of crack.239 Prior to the
enactment, an offender with five grams of crack would be subject to a
mandatory five-year minimum sentence, whereas the same offender,
sentenced after the enactment of the FSA, would be subject to a guideline
range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months.240
The Blewett panel also recognized that failing to apply the FSA
retroactively would lead to the sort of disparate results Congress was
intending to avoid. Under the argument offered by the Government, the
offenders in Blewett would “remain in prison for ten years when under the
new guidelines they would be subject to no minimum at all.”241 Even more
problematic, under the Government’s argument “major drug kingpins” would
be given the “greatest benefit of retroactivity because their amended
guideline range is above the mandatory minimum”242 while offenders like the
Blewetts would not receive the benefits of the FSA because they were

236

Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012).
Id. at 2332 (emphasis added).
238
Id. at 2333.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2013).
242
Id. These hypothetical offenders would not have been sentenced based on the statutory
minimum because they possessed greater amounts of crack. Since they were not sentenced
based on the statutory minimum of the Drug Act, these offenders would have been sentenced
within the Sentencing Guideline ranges, meaning that their guidelines would likely have been
“lowered” within the interpretation of the guidelines offered by the government.
237
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charged based on the mandatory minimum.243 Such a reading of the FSA
would hardly eliminate the unfairness Congress attempted to remedy with the
passage of the act.244
Critics, however, claimed that the original Blewett panel either misstated
or misused the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The dissent’s primary
argument in Blewett was that the panel’s reading of the FSA and revised
Sentencing Guidelines was precluded by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Hammond.245 In Hammond, the court interpreted the FSA to
not apply retroactively.246 Specifically, the court interpreted the phrase
“sentencing range”247 within the Sentencing Guidelines differently than the
original Blewett panel.248 The dissent argued that, given this contrary reading
by another Sixth Circuit panel, the majority falsely invoked the constitutional
avoidance doctrine since there were not two possible interpretations.249 In
essence, the dissent claims that the Hammond decision is binding precedent
on how the court could interpret the sentencing guidelines. With that binding
precedent, there are not two different interpretations to choose from.250
While it is true that for the doctrine to be invoked there must be at least
two possible interpretations of the statute, one cannot foreclose an
interpretation simply because the issue has been decided by another court.251
The court must only find a “fairly possible” reading that clears constitutional
muster, not necessarily the most natural one.252 A court may decide that a
less-than-perfect statute is sufficient in order to avoid a constitutional issue.
It is quite possible that the reading offered by the dissent and the Hammond
court is the most natural reading or even the best reading, but that is not what
the case law requires when attempting to avoid a constitutional issue. For
example, the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business
v. Sebelius upheld the individual healthcare mandate under Congress’s taxing
243

Id. at 492.
The preamble of the act is one sentence: “To restore fairness to Federal cocaine
sentencing.” Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat 2372 (2010).
245
See Blewett, 719 F.3d at 494–98 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (citing United States v.
Hammond, 712 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2013)).
246
United States v. Hammond, 712 F.3d 333 (6th Cir. 2013).
247
See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (2012).
248
Hammond, 712 F.3d at 335.
249
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 495 (2013) (Gilman, J., dissenting).
250
Id. (citation omitted).
251
See Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 700 F.3d 816, 825 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Federal courts
must construe challenged state statutes, whenever possible, so as ‘to avoid constitutional
difficulty.’”) (citation omitted).
252
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012) (quoting Crowell
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
244
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power.253 There, Congress labeled the mandate as a “penalty” within the
Affordable Care Act. The Court has held in the past that Congress does not
have the power to penalize through its taxing power.254 Central to the
majority’s argument was that the most natural reading, one that merely reads
the term as it is, does not bind the Court if such a reading would cause a
violation of the Constitution.255
Therefore, pointing out that there is a better reading of the statutory
provision is not a sufficient criticism of the Blewett majority’s interpretation.
This is especially true since the court in Hammond was not faced with a
constitutional challenge to the application of the Drug Act’s mandatory
minimums and the court did not raise the issue themselves. Here, the court
did as the cannon of constitutional avoidance instructed. The court gave
“effect to congressional intent”256 by interpreting the FSA so that the
discriminatory effects of the Drug Act could be avoided.
CONCLUSION
In April 2014, the Obama Administration took a step in the right
direction by announcing new rules to provide clemency for many of the
offenders that continued to serve sentences under the old 100:1 minimums.257
However, even after the enactment of these new rules, thousands of offenders
still remain in prison based on the old, pre-FSA sentencing guidelines.258
Indeed, although President Obama concluded his presidency “having granted
clemency to more people convicted of federal crimes than any chief
executive in 64 years,”259 the Trump Administration is likely to take a harder

253

Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594.
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 36–37 (1922).
255
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95.
256
Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005); see also Harvey Gee, Striving for Equal
Justice: Applying the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 Retroactively, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
207, 227 (2014) (“The history, purpose, and text of the FSA all demonstrate that it was
intended to apply to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) proceedings commenced after its enactment.”).
257
See Josh Gerstein, Obama Drug Clemency Guidelines Issued, POLITICO, (April 23,
2014, 9:40 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2014/04/obama-drugclemency-guidelines-issued-187266.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TT8H-W8VF.
258
See Sari Horwitz, Justice Department Prepares for Clemency Requests from
Thousands of Inmates, THE WASHINGTON POST (April 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/justice-department-prepares-for-clemency-requests-fromthousands-of-inmates/2014/04/21/43237688-c964-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html,
archived at http://perma.cc/3LWA-YPZT.
259
See John Gramlich & Kristen Bialik, Obama used clemency power more often than any
president since Truman, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(January 20, 2017),
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/20/obama-used-more-clemency-power/.
254
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line on issues of criminal enforcement.260
The original Blewett panel provided a novel solution to a novel issue. In
normal equal protection cases, the state or federal government explicitly
discriminates by way of categorizing the individuals against whom an act
will apply, or an act is explicitly adopted with discriminatory purpose. The
issue considered in Blewett concerns a variety of factors that, if taken alone,
may not rise to the level of an equal protection violation. Courts have found
that Congress did not have the discriminatory intent sufficient to violate equal
protection when it passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, despite evidence
that discrimination could have been at work. Twenty-four years of the Drug
Act’s disastrous consequences gave rise to even more challenges on the basis
that the Drug Act had a discriminatory effect, but this effect alone did not rise
to the level of an equal protection violation. And even when Congress
attempted to remedy more than two decades worth of discrimination, it did
not do so in a way that, based on text alone, would overturn the sentences of
those that Congress otherwise acknowledged were wrongly sentenced. Only
when all these factors coalesced could a valid constitutional argument be
made.
It should be further noted that the logic of the Blewett decision has the
potential to broaden the way equal protection is treated. Indeed, even while
writing in concurrence with the majority in Blewett II, Judge Karen Nelson
Moore, explained that “rather than protecting our citizens, the [Drug Act] has
led to the mass incarceration of African-American men and has bred distrust
of law enforcement in the larger African-American community. It is time that
the federal judiciary determines again whether the Constitution abides such
actions.”261
Few people could reasonably argue that the 100:1 sentencing ratio for
crack made sense. The effect on the African-American community is not and
was not reasonably justified. Despite this clear indication of discrimination,
it was never struck down as violating equal protection because there was
insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent, largely because the standard
for intent creates a high threshold. The United States has a “long history of
facially race-neutral laws targeting African-Americans.”262 It is difficult to
260
See Matt Apuzzo, After Obama Push for Clemency, Hints of Reversal Likely to Come,
New York Times (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/us/politics/obamacommutations-criminal-justice-trump.html.
261
United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 668 (6th Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., concurring).
262
Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., in Support
of Defendants-Appellants, at 17-18. United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013)
(No. 12-5226) (citing Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery By Another Name: The Re-Enslavement
of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II 53 (2008)).
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argue that the Drug Act was not an example of this shameful history. It was
not until Congress acknowledged the widely held view that the old
sentencing ratio exploited and accelerated the Drug War’s effect on the
African-American community that the 100:1 ratio could finally be put to rest.
It was not until Congress explained why the old ratio was unjustified and
discriminatory that a court could constitutionally find it to be in violation of
equal protection.
The Blewett court correctly identified the issues involved. The FSA is
susceptible to multiple, fair interpretations. One of those interpretations, the
one adopted by the original panel, avoids constitutional questions posed by
applying the mandatory minimums of the Drug Act following the passage of
the FSA. If the FSA were to be read in any other way, and the court had to
uphold sentences imposed under the old regime, the court would have to give
legal effect to discrimination, something that courts are prohibited by the
Constitution from doing. The discrimination was not just evidenced by the
overwhelming, persuasive statistics of how discriminatory the old crack
sentencing ratio was, but also by the statements of Congresspersons when the
FSA was enacted. Congress intended to put an end to the effect of the old,
arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing ratio. The original Blewett panel
endeavored to ensure that the statute realized its intended purpose.
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